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从科斯定理看风险的可保性. (2025). 环球社科评论, 2(3), 51-56. https://doi.org/10.62836/ssr.v2n3.0541
从科斯定理看风险的可保性
余鳳全
上海财经大学金融学院，上海
摘要：在极端风险与保险市场受限的情境中，风险可保性成为关键议题。本文回归科斯定理，探讨在交易成本存在下，通过制度设计与保险创新拓展可保边界，提出「产权界定—交易效率—边界拓展」的风险分析框架。以巨灾债券为例，说明参数化设计结合资本市场，如何将原本不可保的风险转化为可承保资产。研究指出，制度创新可提升保险契约效率与承保能力，增强市场韧性。本文认为，风险治理关键在于一场「科斯式改革」：持续降低信息、契约与信用成本，重塑保险作为社会风险治理基础设施的功能。
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[2] R. G. Lipsey and K. Lancaster, ‘The general theory of second best’, The review of economic studies, vol. 24, no. 1, pp. 11–32, 1956.
[3] K. Borch, ‘Equilibrium Premiums in an Insurance Market’, The Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 468–476, 1984, doi: 10.2307/252480.
[4] D. C. North, ‘Institutions, institutional change and economic performance’, Cambridge University, 1990.
[5] O. E. Williamson, ‘The economic institutions of capitalism’, The Political Economy Reader: Markets as Institutions, vol. 27, 2008.
[6] M. G. Jacobides and S. Billinger, ‘Designing the boundaries of the firm: From “make, buy, or ally” to the dynamic benefits of vertical architecture’, Organization science, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 249–261, 2006.
[7] G. Calabresi and A. D. Melamed, ‘Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of the cathedral’, in Modern Understandings of Liberty and Property, Routledge,2013, pp. 139–178.
[8] H. Demsetz, ‘Toward a theory of property rights’, in Classic papers in natural resource economics, Springer, 1974, pp. 163–177.
[9] K. A. Froot, ‘The market for catastrophe risk: a clinical examination’, Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 60,no. 2–3, pp. 529–571, 2001.
[10] J. D. Cummins and M. A. Weiss, ‘Convergence of insurance and financial markets: Hybrid and securitized risk‐transfer solutions’, Journal of risk and insurance, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 493–545, 2009.
[11] M. Lane and O. Mahul, ‘Catastrophe risk pricing: an empirical analysis’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, no. 4765, 2008.
[12] V. J. Bantwal and H. C. Kunreuther, ‘A cat bond premium puzzle?’, The Journal of Psychology and Financial Markets, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 76–91, 2000.
[13] G. A. Akerlof, ‘The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism’, in Uncertainty in economics, Elsevier, 1978, pp. 235–251.
[14] J. E. Stiglitz and M. Rothschild, ‘Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information’, 1976.
[15] J. H. Holsboer, ‘Insurability and Uninsurability: An Introduction*’, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, vol. 20, no. 4, pp. 407–413, 1995.
[16] J. Yu and B. Yen, ‘Re-Think Insurance: A New Perspective of InsurTech’, ICEB 2020 Proceedings (Hong Kong, SAR China), Dec. 2020, [Online]. Available: https://aisel.aisnet.
[17] K. Christidis and M. Devetsikiotis, ‘Blockchains and smart contracts for the internet of things’, IEEE access, vol. 4, pp. 2292–2303, 2016.
[18] P. Baecke and L. Bocca, ‘The value of vehicle telematics data in insurance risk selection processes’, Decision Support Systems, vol. 98, pp. 69–79, 2017.
[19] N. V. Wünderlich et al., ‘“Futurizing” smart service: implications for service researchers and managers’, Journal of Services Marketing, vol. 29, no. 6/7, pp. 442– 447, 2015.
[20] A. Schwartz and R. E. Scott, ‘Contract theory and the limits of contract law’, Yale LJ, vol. 113, p. 541, 2003.
[21] M. Eling and S. D. Marek, ‘Corporate governance and risk taking: Evidence from the UK and German insurance markets’, Journal of Risk and Insurance, vol. 81, no. 3, pp. 653–682, 2014.
[22] M. S. Appaya, H. L. Gradstein, and M. Haji Kanz, ‘Global experiences from regulatory sandboxes’, 2020.
[23] L. W. Cong and Z. He, ‘Blockchain disruption and smart contracts’, The Review of Financial Studies, vol. 32, no.5, pp. 1754–1797, 2019.
[24] A. Acquisti, C. Taylor, and L. Wagman, ‘The economics of privacy’, Journal of economic Literature, vol. 54, no. 2, pp. 442–492, 2016.
[25] F. X. Diebold, G. D. Rudebusch, and S. B. Aruoba, ‘The macroeconomy and the yield curve: a dynamic latent factor approach’, Journal of econometrics, vol. 131, no. 1–2, pp. 309–338, 2006.